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2 Growth is therefore unlikely to be sucient, at least in the short run, to eradicate child labor. Various policy options have been considered to ght child labor. Banning child labor is both impracticable and counter-productive if families rely on child labor for their subsistence; and given the limited trade-o between child labor and schooling, a conditional cash transfers policy would have small eects on child labor. This paper takes another route and discusses the eects of market imperfections on child labor. If we were able to pinpoint which market ineciencies lead to child labor, an alternative policy would be to reduce those market imperfections.
An important body of the literature has already discussed the impact of credit constraints on time allocation choices of children, showing that the less competitive the credit market, the more children work (Baland and Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 2001; Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002) . Some empirical papers have conrmed this view by displaying evidence that households who face shocks tend to make their children work more (Beegle et al., 2004; Dumas, 2009) 3 or that households are unable to smooth their consumption against future incomes (Edmonds, 2006) . There is in comparison relatively 1 Source: Diallo et al. (2010) . 2 Source: World Development Indicators. Gross national income corrected for PPP was $1521 in 2004 and $1973 in 2008; poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day was 55% in 2002 and 5.9% in 2005. 3 Jacoby and Skouas (1997) have also shown that children from households who have received shocks get less educated.
little on the impact of imperfections prevailing on other markets such as land and labor markets.
Some papers have shown that time children devote to work may increase with land owned by the household (Mueller, 1984; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007; Basu et al., 2010) or with the production goods prices (Kruger, 2004; Duryea and Arends-Kuenning, 2003; Cogneau and Jedwab, 2008) , which should not take place if land and labor markets were competitive, because of the separability property (Singh et al., 1986) . This is therefore some indirect evidence that markets are non competitive in developing countries and that this aects children's time allocation. However, the theoretical papers addressing the relationship between land and labor market imperfections are fairly rough: they only derive time allocation choices when households face perfect markets and when markets do not even exist.
None of them tries to identify the eect of a marginal improvement in market imperfections. In addition, no paper has so far tried to identify empirically the eect of market imperfections on child labor nor explored which of these imperfections has a prominent eect on child labor. This paper adds to the existing literature in both ways: it derives a model where the labor market exists but is imperfect (but assumes that there is no land market) and shows that an improvement on the functioning of this market leads to less child labor for all the population except for the children whose parents combine a wage work with farm work. For this last category, a decrease in labor market imperfections can lead to more child work. The second contribution is an empirical one: we evaluate the average eect of land, labor and credit market imperfections on child labor as well as heterogenous eects. The strategy we use is a control one but we match two sets of data in order to rely on a very large set of villages' characteristics as controls. We nd that households who face higher market imperfections use more child labor and that this eect is unevenly distributed among households. However, no occurrence of cases in which an improvement on the markets leads to an increase in child labor is found, which suggests that policies aiming at reducing market imperfections would not have detrimental eects.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the sources of imperfections in markets in rural areas of developing countries and derives a model where households face no land nor credit market but an imperfect labor market. Section 3 describes the data while section 4 provides the results.
2 Market imperfections and child labor
Market imperfections and their eect of child labor
Where do market imperfections come from? In developing countries, information asymmetries are the main source of market imperfections. The most important ones are described hereafter but see Ray (1998) for a detailed presentation. Let us start with labor markets. Agricultural output variation due to weather shocks or pests makes it dicult for the landlord to uncover his tenant's eort. As a consequence, transaction costs are high and there might be a price-band (de Janvry et al., 1991) , in which the landlord prefers not to hire any labor force. The seasonality of the activity generates an additional issue: if land is distributed rather equally, then all the farming households have the same tasks to do at the same time. This synchronicity prevents households to exchange labor and the households owning a large amount of land face a supply shortage. In that case, the price band in which no exchanges are observed is even larger.
Land markets are also recognized as imperfect. Information asymmetries about land quality can create dierences between the rent a landlord can obtain and the land's productivity. In addition, renting out is associated with a risk of land deterioration and, in a context where land rights are not very well dened, with the risk of being expropriated. Sharecropping has been shown to provide some solutions to these issues but we also know that it 4 suers from the Marshallian ineciency, namely a sub-optimal labor supply.
It will be interesting to see what the side eects of such an organization are. That is for the tenancy market. Regarding the sales market, most of the issue lies in the fact that land value can include a non productive part (collateral, prestige) . Insofar as some of this non productive part cannot be bought when the buyer needs a credit with collateral (thereby oering the land he buys as a guarantee), land exchanges are reduced. In addition, non certication of land plots makes also transfers more costly, since the buyer bears the risk of not buying the land from its true owner.
Lastly, credit markets also suer from imperfections due to asymmetries of information between the bank and the borrower. In a world of limited liabilities, the borrower can default quite easily. For this reason, banks lend very little to poor people living in rural areas, which generates a credit shortage. Since in general banks require some collateral, this tends to worsen imperfections in land market. Micronance has greatly improved access to credit in rural areas and generally does not require any collateral.
Market imperfections' inuence on child labor When land and labor markets are competitive, production and consumption decisions are separable 4 (Singh et al., 1986) : child labor decisions depend on production factors insofar as they aect households' prots. If the household owns land or labor in excess, it relies on the market to rent/sell this excess endowment. For instance, households with more land are wealthier and therefore use less child labor. When only one of these two markets is imperfect, it has been shown that the separability holds (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995) : if households face some labor market imperfections but a competitive land market, they can rent out the land that they cannot farm given their labor force endowments; production and consumption decisions are separable. Conversely, a household facing only land market imperfections could compensate via the 4 Production decisions are taken separately from households' preferences and consumption decisions only depend on preferences and prot generated by the activity. 5 labor market if the latter is competitive: it would hire external labor force instead of renting out. Consequently, we will focus on the case where both markets are imperfect.
To keep it simple, we assume that no land nor credit market is available and discuss the changes induced by a worsening of the labor market imperfections. A discussion on the eect of the imperfections bearing on the other markets is postponed after the model. Bhalotra and Heady (2003); Dumas (2007) or Basu et al. (2010) have only considered the 2 polar cases with perfect and competitive labor markets or with absence of labor markets. We start by lling this gap with an analysis of the eect of a continuous change in labor market imperfections.
A model with no land market and an imperfect labor market
To model imperfections, we consider that the household faces a transaction cost on the labor market. In practice, we assume that the wage a household member would earn on the market (w) is strictly lower than the wage they would have to pay if they hired external workers on their farm (w). This transaction cost is due to asymmetries of information regarding the eort made by the worker and therefore the supervision cost they induce. As we will see this transaction cost implies a price-band in which the household prefers autarky.
The household is made of one adult and one child and maximizes its utility:
which is assumed to be additively separable. The marginal utility of consumption (C ) is assumed to be independent from the level of child labor (l c ) and vice-versa.
5 Also, φ > 0 and φ < 0. The adult is assumed to provide 5 This utility is the one chosen by Basu et al. (2010) . Results similar to those of Basu have been obtained with utility function that do not make such assumptions; it is therefore 6 one unit of labor. However, he will choose how to share this unit between own farm production and wage labor.
The production depends on land (k) and labor (l). Once taken into account supervision costs, all types of labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes and
where l a is the time spent by the adult on the farm, l c is child work hours, δ is the productivity ratio between an adult and a child, l e is external workers hours on the farm. We assume:
The budget constraint is:
Implicitly, we assume that children cannot sell their labor force outside the household, which is likely to be the case in rural areas. Of course, the household faces some constraints on time endowments: 0 ≤ l a , l c ≤ 1 and l e ≥ 0. These constraints will dene dierent regimes. If the two wages w and w dier, no interior solution can be found: either the household sells labor or he buys it but would not do both at the same time.
might work on the farm; no external worker on the farm; 3. if the marginal production of labor on land is greater than w but lower than w: the adult devotes all his time to the farm; the child might work on the farm; no external worker on the farm; 4. if the marginal production of labor on land is equal to w: the adult devotes all his time to the farm; the child might work on the farm; some external workers are hired.
Since we assume that marginal production of labor increases with land, these 4 cases are ranked by size of owned land. It is also important to note that cases (2) and (4) are not reduced to one value for k: when k increases, marginal productivity of labor increases, therefore leading to a higher use of labor, keeping the marginal productivity of labor constant. Finally, we do not take into account the corner solutions induced by the limitations for the child's time endowment since they do not generate very interesting cases.
We should just keep in mind that child labor might be censored between 0 and 1 in its variations.
We dene k 1 , k 2 and k 3 as the thresholds in land for switching from regimes 1 to 2, 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 respectively. Let us start by describing carefully how households behave in each of these regimes and then how these thresholds depend on market imperfections. In regime 1, the adult worker is simply a wage earner, whose child may work. The household maximizes U = φ(C) − l c subject to C = F (k; δl c ) + w. As a consequence, they simply equate child's marginal productivity to his marginal substitution rate between consumption and leisure:
this equation will hold true in each regime. We easily show that l c decreases with the wage earned by the adult, w, due to an income eect; but the eect of a variation in k is unclear. The income eect (more land generates more 8 income for the same amount of labor) is partly or fully oset by the price eect (more land leads to a higher marginal productivity of labor, that leads to more labor) (see proof A.1). The overall eect is unknown but we should mention that very simple production functions such as the Cobb-Douglas lead to an increase in l c if k augments. To sum up, in regime 1:
In regime 2, the adult worker shares his labor time between the wage market and his farm. The household maximizes his utility subject to C = F (k; l a + δl c ) + w(1 − l a ). The rst-order conditions are eq.
(1) and:
Quite interestingly, this regime is very dierent from the previous one. We can show that l c decreases with k: the eect in this regime is similar to a pure income eect since the adult is able to fully compensate for a change in marginal productivity of labor (see proof A.2). However, a change in w leads to an income eect, as before, but also to a price eect. To take advantage of an increase in w, the adult has to withdraw some of his time from farm, needing to be replaced (see proof A.3). In regime 2:
In regime 3, the adult worker would like to spend more time on his farm but is limited by his time endowment: he has now become a pure entrepreneur. The budget constraint is given by: C = F (k; 1 + δl c ). The rst-order condition is given by eq. (1) and l a = 1. In this regime, l c does not vary with w nor w. A change in k generates an income eect (more land generates more income for the same labor) but also a price eect (more land leads to a higher labor marginal productivity) that cannot be accommodated by the adult since his time endowment constraint is saturated (see proof A.4).
In regime (3):
In regime 4, the household hire external workers and is subject to the budget constraint: C = F (k; 1 + δl c + l e ) − wl e . The rst-order constraints are eq. (1) and
We easily show that when k increases, only an income eect takes place (an increase in the labor marginal productivity leads to more non household labor on the plot; see proof A.5). When w increases, child labor increases since prot decreases (see proof A.6). In regime 4:
If, for an increase in k, the price eect does not oset the income eect in regimes 1 and 3, then l c decreases with k over the whole range of values. This has proven wrong in dierent studies (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Mueller, 1984; Dumas, 2007; Basu et al., 2010) . This is not very surprising: when income is low, we expect consumption to be much more valued than child leisure. Let us turn therefore to the opposite situation: when the price eect is larger than the income eect (in regime 1 and 3). We plot l c against k in such a setting (graph 1): the question marks underline the fact that the decrease in regimes 1 and 3 is only putative.
A by-pass product of this model is to highlight the fact that all households do not suer from the same market imperfections. For households in regimes 2 and 4, they behave as if they were facing competitive markets.
The easiest way to see this is to notice that child labor decreases with land since there is no price eect associated to land when marginal productivity 10 is equated to the wage: this is due to the fact that they participate in the market. Households in regimes 1 and 3 however are constrained by market imperfections. For households in the rst regime, it is due to the fact that we assumed that the child could not sell his labor force. The most interesting case for us is the third one: when the household would like to hire or to work more but none of these two options is possible. In that case, they rely on child labor and households more endowed in land may make their children work more than poorer households. Now, to understand the eects of a change in market imperfections, we
should not only look at the variation of l c in each regime with the wages but also look at the eects of these wages of the land thresholds, which determine the regime the household falls in. We therefore study the eect of changes in w and w: the smaller w − w, the more competitive the market.
If w increases, then the marginal productivity of labor has to be higher to switch from regime 1 to regime 2. Therefore, the land threshold k 1 increases with w. Again, if w is higher, then farming one's own plot is less attractive and the level of land (k 2 ) for which the adult spends his full unit of time farming his plot has to be higher. Finally, if w is higher, then the marginal productivity of labor has to be higher for choosing to employ non household labor and k 3 has to be higher.
If there is an improvement in the labor market, then w increases and w decreases. This implies that the extent of regimes 1 and 4 increases and that the extent of regime 3 decreases. Only the change in the extent of regime 2 is unknown. In regime 3, child labor does not depend on wages since the 11 household chooses to be in autarky. As a consequence, for households who remain in this regime, the level of child labor is the same. In regime 4, a decrease in w leads to a decrease in child labor. In regime 1, an increase in w leads to a decrease in child labor. As a consequence, for households who remain in these regimes, the level of child labor is lower than when the labor market is characterized by more imperfections. However, the eect of an increase in w is unknown in regime 2. Actually, a continuity argument proves that there is a range in which child labor is higher with less labor market imperfections. To conclude, an improvement in the labor market functioning should lead to a lower use of child labor for households with very little land and households with a high amount of land, should left unchanged households choosing autarky and has a mitigate eect for children from households owning some land (see graph 2).
Imperfect land and credit markets
The previous model assumes that land and credit markets do not exist. In this section, we discuss the eect of their imperfections.
Land market imperfections We mentioned already that if at least one of the two markets was competitive, then households were able to compensate the imperfections of one of the two markets by transactions made on the other. As a consequence, only households who are constrained by the labor market will truly benet from an improvement on the land market. In regime 1, households are constrained by the labor market since they would like to sell child's labor. An improvement on the land market would allow these households to buy or more likely rent in some land, which is expected to result in an increase in child labor. Indeed, extremely poor households are expected to have a high marginal utility of consumption and therefore to use more child labor in order to take advantage of this new opportunity.
In regime 3, households again are constrained by the labor market and the marginal product of their labor is higher than the wage they can obtain on the market. They would like to sell or rent in and produce a higher output with the same amount of labor. Whether these intermediate households would
choose to increase consumption or child leisure is an empirical question. We expect children households belonging to regimes 2 and 4 to be moderately aected by an improvement on the land market since they have access to the labor market.
Credit market imperfections Even if there is a credit supply in a community, it is quite unlikely that households can borrow against their children's human capital. However, if households suer from idiosyncratic shocks, then access to credit could help them smoothen their income over periods without using child labor as a safety net, as it has been proven households do (Beegle et al., 2006) . Obviously, an insurance market would be even more powerful, but given that it does not exist in rural areas, a credit market can be an imperfect substitute for it. As a consequence, access to credit should reduce child labor use.
However, if credit also improves ability to invest, then it may have counter-intuitive eects on child labor. This will be the case if investment improves farm productivity and if households have to rely on their ospring to take advantage of this improvement, namely if land and labor markets are imperfect and if the household is well-endowed in land. This has to be qualied: if a household chooses to invest in a device that is a substitute for child labor (like weedkiller), then this would lead to a decrease in child labor.
The global eect of an improvement on the credit market will be a decrease in child labor if the insurance mechanism predominates but is unknown if major changes in investment choices take place. An empirical analysis is therefore needed to assess how credit market imperfections correlate with child labor.
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3 Data and empirical strategy
What we do
This paper adopts a fairly simple approach. The idea is to assess how child labor varies with each type of market imperfection. Most of these imperfections coexist and reinforce each other. However, from a policy perspective, it is interesting to know which of these imperfections is associated with highest levels of child labor. This calls for an estimation where all of them are taken into account simultaneously, which necessitates a large amount of data.
Indeed, interlinkages between markets as well as covariation in market imperfections would make it dicult to estimate the impact of only one type of imperfections. The main diculties we face are the following ones: being able to describe the imperfections and being able to control for external factors that could spoil the results. For the latter, we expect some characteristics of the village to be correlated both with market imperfections and child time use: among others, remoteness of the village, general level of development, agricultural practices and distance to schools are good candidates for omitted factors.
Our strategy is the following one: we will control for regions or districts xed eects so as to pick up major dierences between areas and we will also rely on a very uncommon source of information in which municipalities characteristics are extremely detailed.
Data
We combine two datasets in this paper. The rst one, named "Enquête Périodique auprès des Ménages" (Epm), surveyed 11781 malagasy households spread out in 561 villages or districts.
7 The survey was stratied along the 22 regions and whether the village is located in an urban or a rural area.
It is representative of the malagasy population. In this paper, since we are 7 The Epm survey has been designed and collected by the malagasy national institute of statistics Instat.
particularly interested in market imperfections' consequences on child labor, we will not consider the major urban centers, where agriculture is unlikely to be an important source of income. We also drop 6 localities from secondary urban centers where no surveyed household owns agricultural land.
This leaves us with 514 localities and 10794 households. In the Epm survey, all household members older than 6 are interviewed and we know their activities, the number of hours they work, their status in the job. In addition to this, we know how much land they own, if it is registered in the cadaster, how they acquired the land, if they rent it, sharecrop it or farm it on their own. By averaging all this information at the level of the village (21 households are surveyed per locality), we build the share of households who receive some land in sharecropping, who lease in, who bought their land, the share of adults (dened as aged between 17 and 45) who engage in wage work along with the median wage for an hour of work.
8 However, the data do not include any measure for the paid wage (w in the model) and we are therefore unable to build a measure of labor market imperfections that proxies w − w.
As detailed in the next section, we rather use the fact that a limited number of transactions on the market are the sign of imperfections. Regarding the credit market, a bank is said to be available to the households if at least 3 of them in the locality said so; same is applied to dene the availability of microcredit or of a usurer.
We will also be able to control for a number of individual or household characteristics, such as: household composition, father's education, age, gender, wealth 9 , whether the household has some debt, and some limited information on the community such as the distance to primary and secondary school.
In addition to this, more detailed information on the localities are needed. 8 We exclude each household from the average when building the village average variables that will be its determinants. 9 We compute an index of wealth or permanent income, thanks to information collected on their consumption durable goods or housing (Sahn and Stifel, 2003) .
For this purpose, we use a municipality census", that was collected in 2001.
10
This survey gathers a lot of very detailed information on infrastructures, agriculture, work opportunities, development and so forth. However, a municipality does not match a village since several fokontany (villages) are grouped into one municipality. We have to assume that the information collected at the level of the municipality are also relevant at the level of the villages. This additional dataset allows us to control for
• the municipality's population, the extent of migration, whether the municipality is close to a lake or the sea, close to a forest, the distance between the municipality's administrative center and its most remote village, whether a farmer association exists, the duration of SOUDURE, the share of households who suer from hunger during this period, and whether the municipality is classied as dangerous;
• the availability in the municipality of a health post center, of a road, of a bush taxi, of a daily market, of a phone (either a landline or a satellite coverage), and of a drinkable water system;
• the rent to pay for a hectare of riceeld, the price to pay for buying a hectare of riceeld, the average price of rice and its seasonal variation;
• the main crop in the municipality, the availability of chemical fertilizers, of non traditional agricultural equipment (plow, for instance), of pesticides or weedkillers, of veterinary products, of improved rice varieties;
• whether it is possible to extend rice cropping within the municipality, and other cropping; 10 The municipality census in Madagascar was organized by the Ilo program of Cornell University at the end of 2001. The survey was organized in collaboration with the National Center for Applied Research for Rural Development (FOFIFA) and the National Statistical Institute (INSTAT). A large part of the data are available at the following url: http://www.ilo.cornell.edu/ilo/data.html
• the number of cattle, the share of farmers who use cattle for pulling, for stalling in riceelds and whether a common place is devoted to water the cattle.
As a consequence, few unobservable characteristics are likely to drive the results. The most important limitation comes from the discrepancy in dates between the household and the municipality survey. However, development is slow in rural Madagascar and most characteristics (and especially those related to agriculture) are expected to remain stable. A second limitation comes from the fact some of the villages belong to a municipality that had not been surveyed in 2001, even though this was supposed to be a census.
We will therefore check that the sample of villages that were surveyed in 2001 does not statistically dier from the full sample. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics regarding markets' functioning.
Markets in the data
Among the 10710 households used in the analysis, few of them have access to credit. Microcredit associations are more available than banks. The land market is characterized by large imperfections since 44% of land is not titled nor registered in a cadaster and 58% of households live in a municipality where no land is rented. However, some transactions take place since only 29% of households live in a municipality where no surveyed household bought some land. About 40% of households live in a place where sharecropping happen, which is the sign that some land market imperfections are combined with labor market imperfections. Finally, the extent of the labor market varies a lot from one municipality to another since 39% of households face a labor market in which more than 25% of adult males are participating while 45% of the households face a labor market where less than a quarter of adult males participate in; the remaining 16% rely on a very limited labor market since there is no wage work in the municipality.
When looking at the correlations between the variables, we nd indeed that some of them are signicant (municipalities with a bank are also more likely to host a microcredit association or municipalities with a large share of registered land also have a higher share of wage workers in the population, see Table 6 in appendix). However, none of these correlations is so large that it should prevent us from identifying the eect of one imperfection measure conditional on the others.
Results

Specication
The specication is the following one: we regress the number of hours of work performed by children on market imperfections measures and on the set of child, household, and community characteristics. We dene children as individuals aged between 6 and 13. We adopt a fairly exible specication with both linear and quadratic eects of each measure (except for credit since the measures are dummy variables). This allows us to take into account mechanisms that have not been modeled: if the labor market is really competitive then children could take the opportunity to sell their workforce.
The eect of an increase in the extent to which households rely on the market is therefore likely to depend on the starting level.
In addition to municipalities characteristics, we also control for region or district xed eects. There are 22 regions in Madagascar and 1?? districts.
Districts on average cover ??? hectares, which is broadly twice New York
City's area. This conditioning is therefore quite ne and allows to identify the eect of market imperfections on within district dierences. The number of municipalities per district in the data ranges from 1 (for 3 districts) to 15.
However, we cannot rule out endogenous placement (of banks, for instance) or existence of remaining unobserved heterogeneity at the municipality or fokontany level and this prevents us from asserting that the estimated eects are causal.
We will rst estimate the average "eect" of market imperfections on child labor and then look into heterogeneity in this eect, depending on land ownership.
Average impacts
The impact of control variables is given in appendix in Table 8 , except for land area and wealth, which are of particular interest and are displayed in Table 2 . We nd that wealth decreases child labor and rice land, conditional on wealth increases child labor, as expected. However, "tanety" land (deforested hill) does not aect child labor. In a specication that we do not include in the paper, we also nd that unconditional on wealth, children belonging to households with more riceland work more.
11 This is an average eect on the whole population but this suggests that indeed the price eect overcomes the income eect when households face a labor market failure. Table 2 Among dierent sources of credit, only the availability of a formal bank is associated with a lower use of child labor. This could come from a greater ability of the bank to move capital across space in case of major aggregate shocks. Regarding the "eect" of the other market imperfections measures, it is easier to look at Table 3 , which provides the eect of a marginal change in the measure at the mean, the 10th and the 90th percentile of the measure. We nd that an increase in the share of titled land or in the share of households who rent in land are associated with lower levels of child labor.
However, no association is found on the sale market. Sharecropping, in con-11 Riceland are not exclusively used for farming rice, since there are some intercrops.
trast, is associated with higher levels of child labor, which is consistent with the fact that it has been shown to prevail when markets are imperfect (Bardhan and Srinivasan, 1971; Schultz, 1965) . The labor market itself plays a role since a larger share of adult wage workers is associated with lower levels of child labor. When the share is high, the marginal eect is positive though but not signicant.
These results point to the fact that, on average, land, labor and credit market imperfections lead to higher child labor. If these gures are taken as causal eects, it would mean that policies that reduce transaction costs on land sales would be inecient. In order to compare the other options, 
Impact of market imperfections by land area
The theoretical model gives dierent predictions depending on how much land the household owns. However, it is very dicult to choose the right land thresholds: from a theoretical point of view, they depend on market imperfections. We therefore start by rening the rst result that child labor We cannot check that directly in the data since we do not know whether a household hires some workers. Given that the median household is composed of 4 persons (two adults and two children), these gures seem plausible.
Our priors are that a decrease in labor market imperfections should left unchanged child labor for households in the third regime (between 20 and 60 ares), and decrease child labor for households who own more land than 60 ares. A decrease in land market imperfections should lower child labor for households with large land endowments. An improvement of the credit market should help rst the less endowed households since they are the ones the most constrained by their lack of collateral. We therefore estimate a similar equation to the ones presented before but allow for dierent eects of market imperfections depending on the regime. In order to do this, we split the sample in three sub-samples and run the same regressions.
13 Table 4 provides the results of the estimations and Table 5 The number of observations with zero hours of child labor attens dramatically the curve. 13 The share of household who bought some land is omitted from the regressions since it was never signicant. 21 have a labor's marginal product between w and w: they are constrained on the labor market. If they can rely on the land tenancy market, they would rent in some land so as to increase their output with the same level of labor.
The result shows that this would lead to a decrease in child labor. The association between sharecropping and child labor vanishes when splitting the sample. Regarding labor market imperfections, we nd that a higher share of adult wage workers and therefore a more competitive labor market leads to less child labor only when the household is well-endowed in land.
This does not come as a surprise since the eect for the intermediate category is predicted to be nil and the eect for the lower category is a mix of a positive and of a negative eect.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show both theoretically and empirically how market imperfections play a role in the use of child labor. We oer a simple model that describes how child labor varies with changes in labor market imperfections. We nd that households are spread in four dierent categories: We nd no household in the rst regime, which suggests that, as soon as some land is available, adults farm it. While the model predicted that, for small ranges of households, improvement on markets could lead to increase in child labor use, the empirical fails to detect such cases. This suggests that policies aiming at improving markets functioning should reduce child labor.
In addition, we show that most ecient leverage would consist in improving the labor market rather than the land market. Finally, we show that the households who would reduce their child labor use following a change in the labor market are the ones with a large level of land (those who used to rely on child labor because access to external workforce is costly) while households who reduce their child labor use following an improvement on the land market are mainly with an intermediate level of land (because they are constrained on the labor market).
In the empirical analysis, while the thresholds for each regime are not ad-hoc chosen but non-parametrically estimated (by plotting how child labor varies with land), we fail to take into account the fact that they should vary with market imperfections. Endogenizing thresholds is left for future research. Similarly, it would be of interest to describe how households' characteristics impact their ability to access the market. This, again, is left for future research. 
Figure 3: Child labor hours against riceland area 25% <share of adult wage workers ≤ 50%
25.0%
50% < share of adult wage workers 13.9% Note: Estimation performed by maximum likelihood (tobit). Additional control variables are the full set of age dummies interacted with gender, households characteristics, ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coecient is signicantly dierent from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Table 2 (covariates are individual's and household's characteristics, community's characteristics and district xed eects). ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coecient is signicantly dierent from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Note: Estimation performed by maximum likelihood (tobit). Additional control variables are the full set of age dummies interacted with gender, households characteristics, ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coecient is signicantly dierent from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Table 4 (covariates are individual's and household's characteristics, community's characteristics and district xed eects). ***, ** and * respectively mean that the coecient is signicantly dierent from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. In regime 1, labor marginal productivity is lower than w and l a = l e = 0.
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Child labor is chosen such as
. Hence:
The second term of the last expression is negative but the rst is assumed to be positive. Hence the total eect, as ∂lc ∂k is of unknown sign and depends on whether the substitution eect overcomes the income eect.
A.2 Regime 2:
In regime 2, the FOC are such that
Total derivatives are therefore equal to zero:
we get:
∂lc ∂w µ and ν are the same functions as in the previous section. By taking total derivatives with regard to l a , l c and w, we show that:
The last expression has the same sign as δ + φ φ 2 (1 − l a ) and it is positive when l a is close to 1.
A.4 Regime 3: ∂lc ∂k
In regime 3, the household maximizes its utility subject to C = F (k, 1 + δl c ).
.
34
As a consequence,
which is of the sign of δF kl + φ φ 2 F k .
A.5 Regime 4: ∂lc ∂k
In regime 4, the household maximizes U = φ(C) − l c subject to:
The FOC imply that:
The total derivatives are therefore equal to zero: 
A.6 Regime 4:
∂lc ∂w µ and ν are dened in the same way as in the preceding section. Total derivatives give:
since both terms are positive. 
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